



## CLIMATE CHANGE, INSURGENCY AND LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE NIGER DELTA: AN ANATOMY OF POST-AMNESTY PROGRAMME

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### Abstract


This paper used the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework in tandem with Political Economy Approach (PEA) to analyse the missing links in the Post-Amnesty Programme of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN). The study collected data from six of 42 communities in Ogbia Local Government Area (LGA), Bayelsa State, Niger Delta region of Nigeria, while some ex-militants, sampled household heads were interviewed. Stratified random sampling method was used in collecting data from 210 houses in the selected communities. Findings confirmed that government concentrates more on ex-militants alone than paying attention to the fundamental causes of insurgency. While the Amnesty Programme has yielded some positive results, the problems and challenges that triggered violence, insecurity and economic loss in the Niger Delta are yet to be given adequate attention. Since resumption of violence, insurgency and vandalism are known for reducing community resilience in the areas of food production, environment, economic capacity of citizen's negligence in addressing critical issues in the region will further expose the citizens to greater impact of climate induced disaster. In the light of this exigency, this paper designs post-Amnesty plan and Programmes that can ensure economic empowerment, employment, poverty reduction, people-centred development and peace-building in the region. Thereafter the paper adopts a Niger-Delta Post-Amnesty Development Model (NDPADM) for the entrenchment of concrete inclusive environmental frameworks and self-governance structures in the Deltan polity so as to generate people-centred development, and thus consolidate the gains of disarmament.

**Key Words:** Climate Change; Environment, Development, Amnesty Programme, Niger Delta

### Introduction

This paper uses the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework in tandem with Political Economy Approach (PEA) to analyse the missing links in the post-Amnesty Programme of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN). This had become paramount in the light of current challenges that climate change poses to oil producing communities. The Niger Delta has been neglected over the years, meaning that the climate change that is affecting the whole world will heighten the problems of socio-economic livelihoods, health and welfare of the Deltans. This is likely to entail double tragedy for them, or what O'Brien and Leichenko (2000) interpret as "Double Exposure". First, they are affected directly by the process by which oil is extracted, and second, they are ultimately rendered vulnerable to climate change-induced catastrophe.

One of the three factors that is important in understanding how a society functions, as identified by Tocqueville (1966), is "the peculiar and accidental situation which providence" places people. This could refer to the environmental and material conditions that are available to people in fashioning their lives. The type of resources within an environment, to a large extent, other things being equal, determines the fortunes of the people in that environment. The discovery of oil in commercial quantities at Oloibiri in 1956 was "expected to be a source of relief from poverty, and oil exploration created visions of future greatness" (Osagie, 2007). Many had hoped that such discovery would spur development in the region. Unfortunately, the results are environmental degradation, ecological devastation, oil spills and gas flares that have destroyed soil nutrients, polluted water and destroyed marine life, disoriented the local economies based on





fishing and farming, and induced population displacement (Ibaba, 2005; UNDP, 2006; Opukri and Ibaba, 2008) and extreme poverty despite the evidence of abundant resources (Ibaba 2008; Enweremadu, 2008; World Bank, 1995).

The affluence exhibited by many workers of the oil companies and political office holders in Nigeria sharply contrasts with the social deprivation of most residents of oil communities whose livelihoods are threatened (Akinola, 1992, 1998, 2000, 2003a, 2005d, 2008b:89, 2010a:56; Obi, 2004:448). The orchestrated politics of exclusion in the region breeds resentment and aggression. In response, the people of oil communities resisted this oppression of the federal government in various ways (Douglas and Ola, 1999:334; Obi, 2000a:281; Akinola, 2008b). Agitations that began as protests by communities demanding attention to development and environmental protection by oil companies turned violent as youth movements have militarized the conflict between the people and the federal government (Ikelegbe, 2006) and the country's ability to expand oil production has been reduced dramatically as a result (Watts, 2007; Osagie, 2009:16).

The current episode in the Niger Delta confirms that the only way to get the attention of those in power is to engage in violence. The failed efforts of the federal government in the use of the Joint Task Force (JTF) and the drastic reduction in oil revenues due to militancy and criminality compelled the federal government to offer Amnesty package to the militants for disarmament. Two questions arise here: (i) Why did government offer Amnesty that the people did not demand for? (ii) Should government wait for violence before listening to community voices?


This paper examines whether the Amnesty Programme addresses the causes of insurgency in term of underdevelopment of the region and unemployment among the youth. A study was conducted in Ogbia Local Government Area, Bayelsa State, Niger Delta region of Nigeria to investigate the extent to which the Amnesty Programme has aided in the development of Ogbia Communities. Findings show that though the Amnesty has produced certain degree of peace in the region, the real problems of underdevelopment, unemployment and environmental degradation are yet to be addressed. Thus, confirming that there are missing links in the post-Amnesty Programme of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN).

In the light of this exigency, this paper adopts Polycentric Planning and Poverty Reduction Strategy (PPPRS) in designing post-Amnesty plan and Programmes that can ensure synergy, economic empowerment, employment, poverty reduction, people-centred development and peace-building in the region. Thereafter the paper adopts a Niger-Delta post-Amnesty Development Model (NDPADM) that is problem-solving and solution-seeking in several sectors of the economy in the Niger Delta. Given the fact that the climate change challenges that are confronting the region have assumed dramatic dimensions, there is the need for the entrenchment of concrete inclusive environmental frameworks and self-governance structures in the Deltan polity so as to generate people-centred development, and thus consolidate the gains of disarmament.

The paper is organized into six sections with the first section containing the introduction, while the second part presents the theoretical underpinning upon which the argument is anchored. The third section discusses the problematics of governance in the Niger Delta, while the fourth part analyses the connection between insurgency, militancy and Amnesty in the region. The fifth section presents innovative post-Amnesty plan that can help in consolidating the gains of disarmament. Conclusion is drawn in section six.

## Theoretical Underpinning

In order to contextualise the line of analysis in this paper, polycentric planning, an off-shoot of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework is adopted. Polycentric planning recognizes the fundamental defects in the centralist model of planning and the persistence failure of the state to meet the





collective yearnings and aspirations of the citizenry. As a result, polycentric planning has called attention to the self-governing and self-organising capabilities of the people that are rooted in collective action at community level. The theories of collective action suggest that people can cooperate with one another, using shared norms to advance their common interest (Ostrom E., 1990; Vincent and Elinor Ostrom, 2003:12). The IAD believes in institutional arrangement designed by people to resolve socio-economic and techno-political problems which other people (external to their conditions) are not capable of doing for them. Such arrangements enable people in the community to make inputs to development by contributing towards projects (labour, finance and materials) and decision-making in political arenas in community settings.

The IAD believes in institutional arrangement designed by people who cooperate based on rules and constitution of their choice, and are thereby able to solve socio-economic and political problems which other people that are external to their conditions are not capable of doing for them. The emphasis is that individuals under certain institutional arrangements and shared norms are capable of organizing and sustaining cooperation that advances the common interest of the group in which they belong (E. Ostrom, 1990). This line of thought recognizes that human can organize and govern themselves based on appropriate institutional arrangement and mutual agreement in a community of understanding.

Using the three key assumptions of political economy approach to policy analysis, this paper applies the Institutional Analysis Development (IAD) framework to analyse how the peoples of Nigeria can solve their problems that are created as they live together as a people and interact in neighbourhoods, communities, cities, local governments, states, region or nation. “The three key assumptions are: (i) Human behaviour is purposive; (2) People’s behaviour is shaped by incentives and constraints/rules; and (3) People are intelligent and creative. The political economy approach to policy analysis asks how individual values of preference get translated into collective processes and outcomes” (Bickers and Williams, 2001: x, 5, 13). The approach enables us to see individuals and the communities in which they live and how they interact in resolving problems of daily existence.

The nexus between the IAD framework and the three key assumptions bears on how the people can solve their problems when they interact and relate as colleagues within development arenas. The central actor in the political economy approach is the individual for two reasons. First, individuals and their actions are what lead to collective problems. Second, individuals, when regarded as colleagues within action arenas come to the level of understanding and reforming collective practices. On the first assumption, the militants and revolutionaries are purposive in their actions – they have a goal – emancipation of the Niger Delta. And if questions that were raised before Amnesty are not answered by post-Amnesty Programmes, then insurgency is likely to resume, possibly, in greater proportions (Akinola 2012a).

On the second assumption, if government and its oil partners are not constraint by environmental laws and rules on pollution and degradation that government itself crafted, and there are no post-Amnesty incentives that will take care of citizens’ aspirations, then the people are likely to break laws that forbid stealing of oil in the creeks. On the third assumption, the Niger Delta youth are intelligent to the extent of learning, over the years, that the only way to get the attention of those in power is to engage in violence. This is confirmed by a World Bank study that found that an astonishing 36.23% of youths in the Niger Delta are willing to take up arms against the government (Oyefusi, 2007).

Consequently, violent attacks on oil installations reduced government income by 50% compared to that of 2008 (Amanze-Nwachuku, 2009). Consequently, government granted Amnesty to the militants, while militants surrendered arms and ammunition. However, it seems that there was (is) no concrete post-Amnesty plan. Following the restoration of peace due to Amnesty, the Nigerian economy grew by 7.2% in the first quarter of 2010 (Subair, 2010) and the federal government decided to allow oil producing communities to own 10% equity share of investments in the oil industry (The Nation, October, 22, 2009). Similarly, government awarded contracts for 44 infrastructure development projects at the cost of ₦179





billion (about \$1.2 billion) to enhance the development of the region. The Presidential Committee on Amnesty distributed ex-militants to several training and skill acquisition centres within and outside Nigeria (Kuku, 2011). It is, however, worrisome to note that only 20% of the estimated cost for the running of the Programmes was allocated to the beneficiaries (ex-militants), while 80% went to consultants and contractors (Obi and Rustad, 2011:205).

Apparently, insurgency and vandalism have resumed in the creeks when government failed to embark on concrete post-Amnesty development (Look, 2010). This has led to the return of various forms of criminality in the Niger Delta. If the Amnesty Programme has been faithfully implemented in a holistic manner, the return of criminal activities would not have arisen. This is in spite of the \$1 billion expended on the Programme since 2009 (Daily Independent Nigeria, 2014). Analysis confirms that violence in the Delta runs to a cycle. This is the third time in recent years violence has intensified - and then followed by concessions and ceasefires. Each time previously, violence has returned to the region. Insurgency and vandalism are known for reducing community resilience in the areas of food production, environment, economic capacity of citizens, etc. It is in the light of the above that this study critically diagnosed post-Amnesty Programme *vis-à-vis* realities in the region.

## The Problematics and Puzzles

The dependence on oil has led to and deepened the socio-economic and political contradictions in Niger Delta region (Akinola, 2011:214). The epidemic of environmental degradation, exclusion, deprivation, unemployment, inequality, poverty, political repression, etc., inflamed solidarity among the youths which engage in divers revolutionary actions – stiff resistant, violent reaction, militancy and hostage taking (Obi, 2009:281, Watts, 2007, Osagie et. al., 2009:16; Akinola, 2008b, 2011e). Scholars have traced the challenges and problems of the Niger Delta to some factors: (1) The structurally-defective governance and winner-takes-it-all syndrome that culminates into unresponsive government policy, (2) Corruption and low public morality among government officials (Akinola and Adesopo, 2011d:1) as large sum of money is allocated to the region regularly but with little or no impact on the lives of the people (Akinola 2008b:93; Osagie et. al., 2009:23; Bankole, 2010), (3) The failure of governments and oil companies gives room for local people to be more effective in responding to community needs and aspirations through self-organizing arrangements, shared strategies and problem-solving interdependencies (see Akinola, 2008b:90,93, 2009b:87-89, 2010a), (4) Pollution of air and drinking water, degradation of farmland and damage to aquatic ecosystem, all of which have caused serious health problems for the inhabitants of the area surrounding oil production.

These problems are largely a case of institutional dilemma which confirms the problem of “disconnect” that is caused by the absence of appropriate institutional mechanisms that could motivate the people (elite and non-elite) to work together as partners in development. The stakeholders in development – governments, oil companies, other agencies and the Niger Delta people – operate on parallel lines, instead of as colleagues with equal standing within governance and development arenas (Akinola, 2008b:92-94, 2009b:83-84, 2010a:67).

Since society is a system of human cooperation, the Nigerian state, oil companies and the people in the Niger Delta should collectively relate together and organize their efforts. Self-organized community institutions in the region were not utilized. For example, community forums have been part of social movements in the fight against both apartheid and post-apartheid inequalities using principles of non-discrimination (Hartslief, 2005:1). The equivalent of *imbizo* in the Niger Delta is *opuwari* (village court of legislators) among the Ijaw in Bayelsa State and *mbogho* among the Efik and Ibibio of Cross River and Akwa Ibom States, *boonator* among the Ogoni in the Niger Delta. It is high time the Deltans. It is high time





the Deltans looked back in retrospect to learn from their roots by harnessing certain self-governing principles that are inherent in their cultural/traditional heritage to address the present challenges (Akinola, 2011c:68). That is why Alagoa (2005) reminds us that the basic Ijaw political system was a stateless organization based on the autonomous settlement without central political authority (Alagoa, 2005:17).

If we agree that institutions matter in terms of their influence on cooperation, then self-organizing and self-governing arrangements that the people of the Niger Delta have adopted in cooperating mutually in responding to their common problems (Akinola, 2008b:95-102, 2009b:87-90, 2010a:68-71) are imperatives as a condition to be met for the effectiveness of Amnesty Programme. Unfortunately, these self-organising arrangements and cultural values were not factored into post-Amnesty Programme. Hence, the Programme did not address the needs of the general populace in the region. The fundamental question is: (1) To what extent has the Amnesty committee factored self-governing arrangements and cultural values of the people into the Amnesty Programme? Focusing on Ogbia Local Government Area in Bayelsa State of the Niger Delta, this research raises the following questions:

- a) What was the level of community development in terms of infrastructural facilities and economic activities (occupation, market) before Amnesty in Ogbia Local Government Area in Bayelsa State?
- b) What is the level of community development after Amnesty?
- c) How has the Amnesty Programme served as a means of youth empowerment in the community?

This study sets out to achieve three objectives and they are:

1. To determine the gaps between Amnesty Programme of the FGN and socio-economic realities and development in Ogbia Local Government Area;
2. To examine the extent to which Amnesty training Programmes have fulfilled the aspirations of ex-militants and ordinary citizens, especially the youth in the region; and
3. To explore the mechanism for engineering people-centred development and peacebuilding in the Niger Delta.

## Methodology

The methodology used in this paper is the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework which is a very powerful analytical tool for diagnosing problems and challenges in human society and for proffering possible solution (V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom, 2003). The IAD framework has three components - exogenous variables or context, action arena and evaluative criteria. Since society is a system of human cooperation, people in any society should collectively relate to and deal with their exogenous variables. This normally starts when people (participants) within an organization/community (action arena) respond to exogenous variables or context (biophysical/material conditions, cultural and other attributes of a community, and rules-in-use) by engaging in community projects/Programmes – water supply, sanitation, electricity, roads, etc. When outcomes of the engagement on projects are positive, the participants will increase their commitment to maintain the structure (system of operation) as it is or move to another set of exogenous variables and then on and on like that. However, if outcomes are negative, participants might raise some questions on why the outcomes are negative. They might then move to a different level and change their institutions to produce another set of interactions and consequently, different outcomes. It is important, however, that rules ‘crafters’ (designers) understand the interplay between actions and outcomes as the duo interlinked.

In the context of this paper, the participants are Governments (federal, state and local) and their agencies, oil companies and citizens in Ogbia LGA who are supposed to interact and operate in synergy. The questions this paper is raising border on how the participants/stakeholders are interacting on the issues of Amnesty Programme, local economic development, infrastructure and service delivery. Consequently, the paper employed empirical data on these issues in the study area.







Primary data were derived from field work through questionnaires, direct observations and interviews. The present (2014) population of Ogbia LGA is projected to be 220,269 (using 2006 census figure of 179,606 as base). With 42 communities/settlements<sup>1</sup> in Ogbia LGA, the population consists of 52.1% males and 41.7% females. Ogbia Town is the Local Government Headquarters. Ogbia LGA is made up of three (3) constituencies which are the three Ogbia clans and they are: Constituency 1: Anyama clan, Constituency 2: Ogbia Central (Oloibiri Clan) and Constituency 3: Kolo clan.

The plan was to select two communities from each constituency. However, because most of the communities in Anyama clan were accessible by water, it was decided to select only Anyama community that is easily accessible. Consequently, three communities were selected in Constituency 2, Ogbia where the local government headquarters is located. Therefore, the six communities that were selected are: (1) Ogbia Town, (2) Akipelai, (3) Anyama, (4) Otuoke, (5) Kolo and (6) Imiringi. Two types of data were collected and they are primary and secondary data. Primary data were derived from the field work while secondary data were derived literature. Qualitative method was used to collect data from state and local government officials as well as officials of agencies and oil companies. The quantitative method was used to collect data from ex-militants, sampled household heads at selected communities. Questionnaires were distributed and in-depth interviews were conducted in the Ogbia communities to ascertain and determine the level of community development before and after the Amnesty Programme.

Data from the sampled communities were collected from the leaders of the communities, youth associations, women groups, disarmed militant groups, occupational groups, members of the communities' etc. The sampling method used was stratified random sampling (see Table 1). Each of the six (6) selected communities was divided into areas, while some areas were selected at random. Out of the selected areas, five (5) compounds were picked, and three (3) houses were selected from each compound at random. At the end of the day, 210 houses were selected, while questionnaires were administered on adults. Data were analyzed using frequency distribution and percentile method.

**Table 1: Sampling Method**

S/n	Settlements	No. of Houses	Areas	Selected Areas	Selected Compound	No. of Selected Houses	Total
1	Ogbia	2,013	7	5	20	3	60
2	Anyama	450	3	2	10	3	30
3	Kolo	627	4	2	10	3	30
4	Otuoke	486	3	2	10	3	30
5	Akipelai	497	3	2	10	3	30
6	Imiringi	680	4	2	10	3	30
	<b>Total</b>	4753	24	15	65		210

Source: Field Survey, 2014

## Data Analysis and Discussions

<sup>1</sup> There are 42 communities in Ogbia Local Government and they are; Oloibiri, Otuaba, Otnogidi, Otuabi, Otakeme, Otabagi, Otmegila, Opume, Emakalakala, Akipelai, Idema, Oturabala I, Oturabala II, Ewoi, Otuaba, Otuoke, Idema, Amorakeni, Kolo I, Kolo II, Kolo III, Emeyal I, Emeyal II, Elebele, Imiringi, Otuasega, Oruma, Ibelebiri, OtuegwelI, Emadike, Epebu, Ewoma, Okiki, Ologoghe, Otuobhi, Otuegwel, Otuegwel I, Otuokpoti, Opume, Akipelai, Emakalakala, Otuoke, Ologi, Ayakoro, Otnedu, Onimbur and Otuogori.





## Analysis of Socio-Economic Characteristics of the Respondents in Ogbia LGA


The results of the analysis show that male respondents (68.6%) are greater than female respondents (31.4%) across the six communities. Majority of the respondents were within the ages of 31-40 (24.3%) and 41-50 (22.4%). These people are adults and as such information got from them is considered to be reliable. Analysis also shows that 95.7% of the respondents are Christians while 4.3% are Muslims. A very low percentage (16.7%) of the respondents were educated to tertiary level, 21% of the respondents had no formal education, 27.1% had only primary education and a higher percentage (35.2%) of the respondents were educated to secondary school level. It is also evident that the highest level of education that the majority (62.3%) of the respondents attained is either primary or secondary school. This confirms the fact that there have been very poor and inadequate educational facilities in the area. This is also as a result of the lack of teachers in the study area.

Analysis indicates that 90.5% of the respondents have blue collar jobs, they engage majorly in handwork, trading and transportation; only a few (9.5%) are civil servants. Most of the youth in the communities are into transport business (road and water) and unskilled labour is by far the majority. It is also evident that majority of the respondents are low income earners; they earn below or a little bit above the minimum wage of ₦18,000 in Nigeria. A very low percentage of 0.5% of the respondents earn between ₦50,000 and ₦100,000 monthly, 8.0% earn below ₦5000; a higher percentage of 51% earn between ₦5,000 - ₦15,000, 24.3% of the respondents' monthly income is within the range of ₦15,001 - ₦20,000 while 16.2% is within the range of ₦20,000 - ₦50,000. Analysis further shows that the majority (61%) of the respondents' family/household size is within the range of 1-5 members, 0.9% of the respondents' family/household size is 16 and above, 11% ranges from 11-15 while 27.1% ranges between 6-10 members.

Analysis shows that the majority (76.7%) of the respondents expressed that it has been peaceful after Amnesty, 4.8% of the respondents expressed that it is fairly peaceful while 18.5% expressed that it is very peaceful. The analysis also shows that even after the Amnesty Programme there are still conflicts and criminal activities in the area; 15.7% of the respondents confirmed that there were communal clashes some months ago, 52.9% attested that there were communal clashes few years ago, while 36.2% were of a different opinion that the last communal clash occurred before Amnesty. The majority (41.9%) of the respondents were of the opinion that the last vandalism of properties was before the Amnesty, 4.8% expressed that there has been vandalism of properties weeks ago, 24.8% expressed that it was months ago while 28.5% of the respondents stated that the last vandalism of properties was years ago. A higher population of the respondents (63.8%) expressed that they felt fairly secured before the Amnesty while other respondents felt secured (4.8%) or not secured (31.4%). However, majority (63.8%) of the respondents expressed that after the Amnesty they feel secured, while other respondents felt very secured (14.2%) and fairly secured (13.8%).

## Social Infrastructure

Analysis of data on social infrastructure shows that the majority (62.8%) of the respondents expressed that health facilities are in bad condition while a lesser percentage (35.2%) of the respondents expressed that health facilities were good. Findings also indicate that 30% of the respondents expressed that the health facilities have improved and are good after the Amnesty while 70% of the respondents still maintained that the health facilities are still in bad state. A higher percentage (84.8%) of the respondents expressed that the Amnesty Programme provided no improvement to the education facilities in the region, while a few (16.2%) were of a different opinion that there has been improvement in the educational facilities in the region. The analysis shows that a total percentage of 54.3% of the respondents expressed





that there has been improvement in economic activities in their communities after the Amnesty Programme while 45.7% felt differently, that there has been no improvement. It is clear that the Amnesty Programme did not really have much effect on the housing condition in the communities as indicated by the majority (89%) of the respondents. Majority (63.8%) of the respondents expressed that the Amnesty Programme had effect on road and vehicular movements in the region, while a lesser percentage (36.2%) expressed that they did not feel the Amnesty Programme had any effect on road and transportation.

Some 54.3% of the respondents expressed that it is safer to travel on water (25.7%) and transport goods and services, while 28.6% and 23.8% affirmed that roads have been constructed and repaired respectively. We can conclude that the Amnesty Programme has had a positive impact on road networks and transportation in Ogbia LGA with respect to security and safety. A higher percentage of 77.6% of the respondents expressed that the Amnesty Programme fairly improved law and order in the study area, while 22.4% of the respondents were of different opinion; 18.7% expressed that the Amnesty Programme improved law and order while 4.1% felt that there was no improvement. It is apparent that the Amnesty Programme has fairly improved law and order in the region.

### Assessment of Amnesty Programme

**Table 2: Respondents' Assessment of Amnesty Programme**

		Centered on rehabilitation and pardon of ex-militants	Only for the powerful few	Not properly implemented	Good Programme for youths enlightenment	Unnecessary	Promote peace	Attention of the government	Total
Ogbia Town	Freq. %	20 33.3	3 5.0	19 31.7	2 3.3	3 5.0	5 8.3	8 13.3	60 100.0
Akipelai	Freq. %	13 43.3	4 13.3	3 10.0	1 3.3	2 6.7	4 13.3	3 10.0	30 100.0
Anyama	Freq. %	12 40.0	6 20.0	5 16.7	- -	3 10.0	3 10.0	1 3.3	30 100.0
Kolo	Freq. %	14 46.7	7 23.3	1 3.3	1 3.3	2 6.7	2 6.7	3 10.0	30 100.0
Imiringi	Freq. %	4 13.3		19 63.3			7 23.3		30 100.0
Otuoke	Freq. %	4 13.3	8 26.7	9 30.0	4 13.3		3 10.0	2 6.7	30 100.0
Average Total	%	31.9	13.3	26.7	3.8	4.8	11.4	8.1	100.0

Source: Field Survey, 2014.

From Table 2, it is clear that the majority of the respondents (31.9%) felt the Amnesty Programme centered on the rehabilitation and pardon of ex-militants; 13.3% were of the opinion that the Amnesty Programme was only for the powerful few; 26.7% attested that the Amnesty Programme was not properly implemented. It is evident that majority of the respondents did not subscribed to the notion that the Amnesty Programme had any impact on them, though most of them acknowledged that it was a good programme that brought peace. They attested that the Programme was only for the powerful militants but the militants who were not powerful and youth that were not involved in militancy were neglected.

The Impact of the Amnesty Programme







Table 3: The Impact of the Amnesty Programme

		Ogbia Town		Akipelai		Anyama		Kolo		Imiringi		Otuoke		Total %
		freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	Freq	%	
<b>Impact of the Amnesty Programme on you</b>	Positive	10	16.7											4.8
	Fairly positive	27	45.0	13	43.3	22	73.3	10	33.3	9	30.0	18	60.0	47.1
	Negative													
	No effect	23	38.3	17	56.7	8	26.7	20	66.7	21	70.0	12	40.0	48.1
	Total	60	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	100.0
<b>Effect of Amnesty on community development</b>	Positive											1	3.3	0.4
	Fairly positive	18	30.0	3	10.0	8	26.7	16	53.3	8	26.7	9	30.0	29.5
	Negative													
	No effect	42	70.0	27	90.0	22	73.3	14	46.7	22	73.3	20	66.7	70.0
	Total	60	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	100
<b>Do you think the Amnesty empowered youths?</b>	Yes	46	76.7	15	50.0	15	50.0	20	66.7	20	66.7	28	96.7	68.5
	No	14	23.3	15	50.0	15	50.0	10	33.3	10	33.3	2	3.3	31.4
	Total	60	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	100.0
<b>If yes, state how</b>	Positive value system and series of training Programme	16	26.7	5	16.7	5	16.7	10	33.3	8	26.7	18	60.0	29.5
	Some youths are trained abroad	10	16.7			2	6.7	4	13.3	2	6.7	3	10.0	10
	Some youths receive monthly allowances from the government	10	16.7	5	16.7	3	10.0	4	13.3	6		2	6.7	14.2
	Reduced criminal activities of youths	10	16.7	5	16.7	5	16.7	2	6.7	4	13.3	5	16.7	14.7
	Total	46	76.7	15	50.0	15	50.0	20	66.6	20	66.7	28	96.7	68.6
	No comments	14	23.3	15	50.0	15	50.0	10	33.3	10	33.3	2	3.3	31.4
	Original total	60	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	100.0
<b>Employment and Employability</b>	Yes	44	73.3	20	66.7	21	70.0	18	60.0	13	43.3	18	60.0	5.7
	No	16	26.7	10	33.3	9	30.0	12	40.0	17	56.7	12	40.0	36.2
	Total	60	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	100.0
<b>If yes, state how</b>	Some youths are employed	11	18.3	6	20.0	2	6.7	4	13.3	6	20.0	5	16.7	16.2
	Some youths are self-employed	15	25.0	4	13.3	10	33.3	5	16.7	4	13.3	2	6.7	19.0
	Youths can now get jobs	18	30.0	10	33.3	9	30.0	9	30.0	3	10.0	11	36.7	28.5
	Total	44	73.3	20	66.7	21	70.0	18	60.0	17	43.3	18	60.0	65.7
	No comments	16	26.7	10	33.3	9	30.0	12	40.0	17	56.7	12	40.0	36.2
Total	60	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	30	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2014.

The analysis in Table 3 shows that 4.8% of the respondents expressed that the Amnesty Programme had a positive impact on them, 47.1% of the respondents felt the Amnesty had a fairly positive impact on them while 48.1% expressed that there has been no impact on them. It is clear that the Amnesty Programme had positive impact on a few respondents and had no impact on the majority. Further findings show that only 0.4% of the respondents attested that the Amnesty had positive impact on community development, 29.5% of the respondents had a fairly positive impact while 70% of the respondents expressed that the Amnesty Programme had no impact on them. Majority (68.6%) of the respondents expressed that the Amnesty Programme empowered the youth, while other respondents (31.4%) were of a different opinion that the Amnesty did not empower the youth.

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The analysis reveals that majority (65.7%) of the respondents expressed that the Amnesty Programme enhanced employment and employability of the youths, while a lesser percentage (36.2) felt differently that the Amnesty Programme did not enhance employment or employability. Interviews with members of the communities and ex-militants made it clear that the Amnesty Programme enhanced employability but employment was not created. The region is devoid of industries and as such some ex-militants who could not get jobs start their own businesses or remain unemployed.


## Summary of Findings

The findings revealed that the Amnesty Programme focused on rehabilitation of ex-militants. Majority of the respondents (31.9%) expressed that the Amnesty Programme was centered on rehabilitation and pardon of ex-militants. It is also clear that the training was directed at the beneficiaries and no effort was made concerning community development. The respondents indicated that before the Amnesty Programme, most of the facilities and infrastructure were in very bad conditions. The facilities available were very inadequate. Lack of proper management of electricity generators installed by the oil companies made people to live in darkness. This is because the generators would not be repaired for several months when they developed faults. It was also pointed out that even after the Amnesty Programme, there were no improvement. Majority of the respondents (62.8%) expressed that the health facilities available are in bad conditions and are inadequate. Majority of the respondents (84.8%) also expressed that the Amnesty Programme brought no improvement to the educational facilities.

The study also revealed that there have been some improvement in economic activities in the region after the Amnesty Programme. The members of the communities emphasized on how it was difficult to transport goods before the Amnesty. At that time, there were no motor-able roads to the communities and they depended on water transportation for conveyance of goods and material to markets. This also increased the cost of living in the communities. There was high rate of water crimes as the militants and sea pirates operated on waterways. This is why the respondents that are farmers, transporters and traders responded that they did not feel safe or they felt fairly safe at their place of work before the Amnesty. The respondents (45.7%) indicated that after the Amnesty Programme, the economic activities in the area improved. There was free flow of goods and services, people are less afraid of travelling by water and transportation had been made easier and more profitable for transporters. However, there was no improvement in the provision of markets and most of the communities in the study area do not still have markets after the Amnesty. The respondents complained about the lack of industries that can create jobs for the people. The majority of the respondents (54.3%) were of the opinion that there has been no improvement in economic activities in the region - the region is still underdeveloped.

Some of the respondents (16.7%) acknowledged that the Amnesty Programme provided employment for some of the youth. But from interviews with the members of the communities, majority of the respondents pointed out that the Programme affected only the powerful few which are the powerful militants that were insurgents. Other militants who did not belong to the powerful groups and youth that were not involved in militancy were sidelined. Findings also show that some pretended to be militants so that they could partake in the collection of allowances. Some of the militants that were impacted by the Amnesty were sent abroad and trained in different skills. Although, it was acknowledged that few of them have jobs, some of the ex-militants, after being trained and empowered, returned home and still remained jobless. Some of the ex-militants have started small businesses for themselves and are surviving. Those that cannot start their own businesses engage in menial jobs for survival.

Majority of the respondents (76.7%) expressed that their communities have been peaceful since the Amnesty Programme. The respondents also attested to a more secured environment after the Amnesty Programme compared to the situation before the Amnesty Programme. Besides, over 50% of the





respondents confirmed that even after the Amnesty Programme there are still communal clashes in recent times. 73.3% of the respondents affirmed that there were vandalism of oil pipelines after Amnesty and 19.1% also stated that such took place even months ago. Majority of the respondents (59.1%) also affirmed that cases of burglary and robbery are still very rampant in the area. This shows that youth are still involved in criminal activities even after the Amnesty Programme suggesting the possibility of the unemployed youth going back into militancy. Since resumption of violence, insurgency and vandalism are known for reducing community resilience in the areas of food production, environment, economic capacity of citizens; negligence in addressing critical issues in the region will further expose the citizens to greater impact of climate induced disaster.

## Niger-Delta Post-Amnesty Development Model (NDPADM)

This paper designs plans and strategies to complement the Amnesty Programme of the Federal Government by adopting a Niger-Delta Post-Amnesty Development Model (NDPADM) that can help in building peace and engineering people-centred development in the region. NDPADM is conceptualized as a deliberate act of combining both the ‘known’ and the ‘unknown’ variables in the Niger Delta using the IAD framework and several pragmatic problem-solving and solution-seeking African Development Models (see Fig. 1). NDPADM derives inspirations and working mechanisms from fifteen (15) African development models (see for details, Akinola, 2011e).

According to the model, the known variables are: the number of amnestied persons, budget earmarked for Amnesty Programme, training and job opportunities. On the other hand, unknown variables include: the number and likely impact of revolutionaries, the reconstitution of MEND, the dynamics of poverty and neglect, unemployment impact, criminal activities, etc. The unknown variables and their implications call for a well-designed and robust post-Amnesty plan. It is in this light that NDPADM embraces a system that will be self-organizing, self-governing and self-regulating through the use of the IAD. The IAD suggests that institutions are crafted by participants within action arenas in response to their particular exogenous variables.

This response is a condition for collective action that necessitates the setting up of a new institutional arrangement through PPPRS whereby the efforts of the stakeholders/participants in the public terrains – politicians, bureaucrats, technocrats, scholars, multinationals and citizens – are synergized through public sphere restructuring mechanism (see for details, Akinola 2010a). The restructuring process will commence, first, with the setting up of self-governing community assembly (SGCA) where participants through their institutions (governments with their agencies, oil companies, higher institutions, community institutions) can operate in synergy.

The second step is a value re-orientation among African scholars, public officials and other participants. This new orientation, invariably, determines: (a) the ability of scholars to take theories to the streets and applied them for the benefit of the citizenry; (b) the synergy between and among scholars and public officials in executing socio-economic and techno-political projects; and (c) the relevance and indispensability of self-governing community institutions in decision making.

Next, the participants would operate using rules that are crafted by members at the SGCA. Rule crafting takes place at three levels – constitutional, collective choice and operational. The effectiveness of this strategy has been proved in an experiment performed in Irepodun Local Government area of Osun State, Nigeria between 2005 and 2006 by the author (Akinola 2007f:230). Based on the Irepodun experience, the adoption of polycentric privatization strategy could avail the citizens in the Niger Delta the opportunities to dialogue in community assembly and jointly own resources and take decision on how resources (financial and natural) are to be allocated and utilized. This is where Amnesty Programme becomes relevant. Amnestied persons should be involved in the activities of community assembly where





they can function as agents of change in development arenas (see a good example of Oodua Peoples' Congress [OPC] in Akinola, 2009a:270-271). Invariably, the Amnesty Programme would enable ex-militants, freedom fighters and revolutionists to make meaningful contributions towards development.

The outcome of the restructuring is emergence of new institutional arrangements, which would reflect integrative constitutional order in socio-economic and techno-political realms. It is this joint action and synergy by the three groups (scholars, public and private officials, and representatives of community self-governing institutions) that would eventually determine how government policies in all spheres of life are to be implemented. After the institutional arrangement has been designed, operational strategy for implementation of any Programme/project (e.g. employment generation, food security, road development, poverty reduction, environmental management, electoral reform and democratisation, security of life and property, conflict detection, prevention and resolution, etc.) can then be fashioned out (see Akinola 2007f, 2008b,p, 2009a, 2010a, 2011a). The result of post-Amnesty polycentric development planning as shown in Fig. 1 is peace and people-centred development.


## **Pilot Projects: Food Security and Employment Generation**

This section focuses on how pilot projects can be set up to apply several African development models at the community level. The Federal government and its agencies (MND, NDDC) with scholars of high integrity can kick start food security and employment generation Programmes. Food-related activities and employment generating ventures that could be embarked upon include: (1) Large-scale mechanized farms in the cultivation of oil palm, yam, cassava, maize, guinea corn, fruits, etc. (2) Food processing plants – yam flour, cassava flour, maize, fruits, etc. (3) Animal husbandry section – fishery, poultry, rabbitry, pigry, goatry, cattle and other ruminants. The implementation strategy of the proposed project is highlighted under fifteen stages (for details, see Akinola 2008p:194-195; 2009f).

## **Conclusion**

This paper concludes that government concentrates more on ex-militants alone than paying attention to the fundamental causes of insurgency, while the lack of concrete plan and preparedness on the part of government for post-Amnesty Programme gives room for resumption of violence. While the Amnesty Programme has yielded some positive results, the grey area that can address the problems and challenges that triggered violence, insecurity and economic loss in the Niger Delta are yet to be given adequate attention. It is evident that the policy makers did not work with the people before embarking on this Programme. As a result, the Programme focused on rehabilitation and the training of ex-militants, while no effort was made concerning community development. After the Amnesty Programme, there was no improvement in the areas of health and educational facilities and in the provision of markets. There is still a high level of poverty in the area as there are no industries to create jobs for the people.

Given the fact that the climate change challenges that are confronting the region have assumed dramatic dimensions, there is the need for the entrenchment of concrete inclusive environmental frameworks and self-governance structures in the Deltan polity so as to generate people-centred development, and thus consolidate the gains of disarmament. Without mainstreaming diverse interests in the Niger Delta to operate as colleagues with equal standing such that oil benefits are shared equitably, Amnesty Programme will be tantamount to fire brigade exercise, a waste of resources and a cycle of reinforced violence. Since resumption of violence, insurgency and vandalism are known for reducing community resilience in the areas of food production, environment, economic capacity of citizens; negligence in addressing critical issues in the region will further expose the citizens to greater impact of





climate induced disaster. With this scenario, frequent violence and conflicts in the region cum climate-change induced disaster will worsen the livelihoods and plummet the welfare of Niger Delta citizens.

In the light of this exigency, this paper adopts Polycentric Planning and Poverty Reduction Strategy (PPPRS) in designing post-Amnesty plan and Programmes that can ensure synergy, economic empowerment, employment, poverty reduction, people-centred development and peace-building in the region. There after the paper adopts a Niger-Delta Post-Amnesty Development Model (NDPADM) that derives inspirations and workability mechanisms from African development models that are problem-solving and solution-seeking in several sectors of the economy in the Niger Delta.

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


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


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